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JOHN 
v. 
BONI 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. GEORG EDES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
No. 17073 
A. GEORGEDES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A Decree of Divorce was entered awarding each of the parties 
a Decree of Divorce from the other; awarding plaintiff all home 
and business real property and other business and personal assets; 
awarding defendant certain personal property and restoration 
of her former name. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an equitable division of jointly owned real 
property, an award of alimony reasonably related to her prior 
household allowance, and an award of attorney's fees incurred 
in this action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-appellant, Boni A. Georgedes (hereinafter "Boni") 
was married to plaintiff-respondent, John A. Georgedes (herein-
after "John"), on April 15, 1972. (F.f. 2, R. 120). 
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At the time of the marriage of the parties, John operate: 
laundry and dry cleaning business which he was purchasing fr~ 
father, (F.F. 5, R. 121) and a home which he had acquired pr:: 
the marriage. (F.F. 5, R. 121). 
At the time this action was commenced and for about seve; 
(7) years prior, John and Boni were owners, subject to debts 
thereon, of the home of the parties and Price Self Service La: 
dry, including the building and land. (F.F. 5, R. 121; Ex. 7, 
For the greatest part of their marriage, John paid Boni 
a household allowance of six hundred dollars ( $600. 00) per mer 
(Tr. 10, L. 19-25) with which she purchased food for the famii 
and household furniture (Tr. 71, L. 19-23; Tr. 78, L. 19-221, I 
improved the home of the parties. (Tr. 69, L. 16-20). 
From early in the marriage difficulties arose between the1 
I I 
parties which Boni sought to resolve by obtaining counseling, 
but which John declined. (Tr. 35, L. 3-25; Tr. 36, L. 1-7;Tri 
L. 12-16) . 
Boni has a son by a prior marriage who receives veteran'! 
and social security survivor's benefits and is the beneficiar: 
of a trust account established by the Utah Industrial Commiss: 
arising from the death of his father in an industrial accidenc 
"(R. 95; R. 101; F.F. 8, R. 123). 
I 
Following trial of the matter, the Court entered its Med 
dum Decision on October 15, 1979. (R. 92-97). Defendant's ~c:I 
for a new trial was filed November 26, 1979, (R. 98-100), in·' 
-2-
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eluding as a basis therefor the claim that the award to defendant 
was inadequate, appearing to have been given under the influence 
of passion or prejudice. The Court then entered a "Supplemental 
Order" (R. 111) authorizing restoration to Boni of her former 
name. Defendant thereafter moved the Court for an Order to Show 
Cause generally seeking enforcement of compliance with the Rules 
of Practice of the District Courts (R. 113) which was denied. 
(R. 119). Ultimately, on March 19, 1980, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce were entered (R. 
120-128) and on March 31, 1980, defendant's motion for a new trial 
was denied. (R. 136-138). 
Whereupon this appeal was taken. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE LAWFUL 
MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES IN AWARDING PROPERTY 
AND SUPPORT 
The court found (F.F. 2, R. 120) that, ''Plaintiff and defen-
dant were married on April 15, 1972, since which time they have 
been and now are husband and wife." In contradiction of that 
finding of lawful marriage, the court expressly based denial 
of alimony upon, among other things, ''that the actual factual 
marriage relationship of the parties was an extreme short dura-
tion." (R. 93-94; F.F. 10; R. 124). The conclusion is ines-
capable that the court's determination in this regard affected 
all other matters before it, including award of marital property. 
-3-
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The contradiction itself begs logic; the findings of the 
court amount to a nunc pro tune determination of divorce a men 
- ---...;_ 
et thoro. Even in this analogy, the court may not ignore the 
obligation of support a husband owes his wife. ( 24 Am.Jur. 2c 
Divorce and Separation, Section 1, n.1, citing Pettis v. Pett; 
91 Conn. 608, 101 A 13, 4 ALR 852) 
In relying upon the artificially truncated length of t~ 
marriage, the trial court has flown in the face of prior deci, 
of this Court. In English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409 119;· 
this Court condemned, "the standard utilized by the trial cou:: 
vis., the length of the marriage and the contributions of eac:. 
to their joint financial success [as] ... an appropriate mea~n 
to determine alimony." 
The legislature of the State of Utah has enacted laws gri 
ing the marriage relationship (Section 30-1-1, ~· ~·, U.C .. '. 
1953, as amended) and, no determination having been made t~t1 
marriage is void or voidable, or any challenge to its legalit 
having been raised, the trial court improperly chose to disrnl 
the legal status of the marriage, and, further, to impose a 
judicial interpretation which violates the separation of powe: 
mandated by Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution of UtJ 
In the event this matter is remanded for trial, the trial 
court should be instructed to consider this matter in light~ 
actual legal period of the marriage. 
-4-
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Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIVESTING THE DEFENDANT 
OF HER JOINT TENANCY INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
A trial court may not ignore the conveyance of real property 
to a spouse (e.g., R. 94) such as here, where John conveyed to 
Boni a joint tenancy interest in one of the businesses and the 
home of the parties seven years prior to the divorce, but, must 
presume the validity of the conveyance. (Section 30-2-2 U.C.A., 
as amended) . 
The court made extensive findings under the rubric "Defen-
dant's Property" (R. 123, para. 8), but did little more than 
list assets under the rubric "Plaintiff's Property" (F.F. 5, 
R. 121). 
While the court found that "during the initial year of the 
marriage, plaintiff placed his wife's name as a joint tenant 
with him on the family home and the coin operated laundry in 
Price, Utah" [emphasis added] (F.F. 5, R. 121), that language 
denigrates the legal status of the parties, relative to the proper-
ty, which might more accurately be stated that ''from approximately 
seven years prior to initiation of this action, plaintiff and 
defendant owned, as joint tenants, the home of the parties and the 
coin operated laundry in Price, Utah." Inasmuch as those jointly 
owned properties were treated as "Plaintiff's Property." (F.F. 5, 
R. 1212) the court demonstrated a predisposition to award the 
joint tenancy property to John by simply dismissing the conveyance 
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out-of-hand as an irrelevancy. 
Although a trial court has "the power to take property '.: 
one spouse and to award it to another where the interests oi 
justice so requires," "the court cannot act arbitrarily or or: 
supposition or on conjecture as to facts upon which to justi~ 
its order." Iverson v. Iverson, Utah, 526 P.2d 1126 (19741 ci:. 
Slaughter v. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421 P.2d 503 (19661. 
Thus in taking property from one spouse and awarding it to tht 
other, as was done here with joint property, it seems clear t~ 
a trial court must make specific findings upon which the aware 
is based, and resort should not be made to ex post facto edit::, 
synopsizing of the findings to justify the action. (R. 131, pi:, 
2) 
Where, as here, a court awards all of the capital assets ; 
marriage to one party, all factual matters should be scrutinizo 
to insure that the court's division of property is equitable. 
(Pope v. Pope, Utah 589 P.2d 752, 753 (1978)). 
The trial court ignored Boni's legal ownership of these 
assets; her continued contribution to their acquisition duri~' 
marriage; her liability for debts attendant to their acquisit! 
and preservation; the legislative direction that conveyances 
between husband and wife are to be treated as valid as if mad; 
between other persons (30-2-3, U.C.A. 1953, as amend2dl; and 
a wife's property rights are independent of her husband and ]i 
not be dismissed at the whim of the trial court (Section 30->' 
-6-
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u.c.A. 1953, as amended). 
The only evidence given as to the value of the home of the 
parties was the unrebutted testimony of Boni (Tr. 69, L. 4-9) 
that the home was conservatively worth seventh thousand dollars 
($70,000.00); at about the time of the marriage the home was 
appraised as having a value of twenty nine thousand dollars 
($29,000.00). (R. 62, Ans. 4(e)). Debt on the property at about 
the time of initiation of this action totaled $16,219.20, (R. 
40-41, Ans. 6(b) and 6(c)), resulting in apparent equity of ap-
proximately fifty three thousand dollars ($53,000.00), and an 
increase in value during the marriage of approximately forty one 
thousand dollars ($41,000.00). 
As to the business owned in joint tenancy, the Price Self 
Service Laundry, the only evidence was the undisputed testimony of 
Boni (Tr. 70, L. 21-25) that it had a conservative value of seven-
ty five thousand ($75,000.00l to one hundred thousand dollars 
($100,000.00). Plaintiff supplied an appraisal made in April, 
1975, showing the premises to have a fair market value of 
$48,167.00 (R. 79-81). The debt against the Price Self Service 
Laundry as of June 11, 1979, was $19,054.79 (R. 40, Ans. 6(a)), 
and a portion of the balance owing to his father totaling 
$46,351.25 as of July 1, 1979, (R. 41, Ans. 6(a)). Since the 
total agreed upon purchase price (R. 66-67) allocated to the Price 
Self Service Laundry of forty seven thousand dollars ($47,000.00) 
represents forty two percent of the total purchase price for the 
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laundry business, the pro rata amount owing to John's father~ 
the Price Self Service Laundry would be $19,467.53. There is 
apparent equity in the Price Self Service Laundry owned join( 
the parties of between thirty eight thousand dollars ($38,000. 
and sixty three thousand dollars ($63,000.00). 
Having concluded, as to the business, that, "except for 
perhaps the inflated value attached to the real property, the:: 
not evidence before the court of any increase in net worth tho: 
not offset by the increase in indebtedness [and that] the ev'.:' 
shows that the business has little value from an income sta~ 
and remains open purely as a result of the charity of plaintL; 
father" and as to the home, that "there is no evidence presend 
to the court to show what [the increase in value during t~ ~ 
riage] may be," (R. 94) the calculations set forth above to frj 
strate equity were rendered unnecessary. 
It cannot pass without remark that John, at every step, 
disclaimed any ability to express an opinion as to value of~ 
joint property of the parties (R. 60, Ans. l(i), 2(i), 3(£1,· 1 
Tr. 42, L. 24-25, Tr. 43, L. 1-7) and that the court only n· 
luctantly permitted Boni to express an opinion as to the vale:': 
the property (Tr. 70, L. 3-14), and misstated Utah law in surr1 
of its apparent intent to disregard her opinion. (State of~ 
by and through its Road Commission v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 1~1 
P.2d 507 (1970) citing Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., v. Schramm,'·' 
I 
Utah 53, 189 P. 90). In addition, "it has long been the ruL 
-8-
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this state that an owner of real property, who is familiar with 
his property, is entitled to testify as to its value and to give 
his opinion thereon." Williams v. Oldroyd, Utah, 581 P.2d 561 
(1978) citing Provo River Water Users Ass'n v. Carlson, 103 Utah 
93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943). 
By its action, the trial court has divested Boni of her joint 
tenancy interest in property having equity, according to her 
testimony which was the only evidence presented as to value, 
totaling between ninety one thousand dollars ($91,000.00) and one 
hundred sixteen thousand ($116,000.00). 
Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THIRD 
PARTY INCOME AND ASSETS IN MAKING AWARDS OF 
PROPERTY AND ALIMONY 
The trial court made much of the fact (F.F. 8, R. 123) that 
by John's support of Boni's child, "assets had been accumulated 
having an aggregate value in excess of $25,000.00." The court 
acknowledged the parties' agreement that survivor's benefits 
payable to Boni's child were to be put in savings for the child's 
future (Tr. 85, L. 25; Tr. 8, L. 1-13; Tr. 59, L. 15-19), but 
regarded those savings as an asset "which she can see as she sees 
fit" (R. 95, F.F. 8, R. 123) contrary to Boni's unrebutted testi-
mony (Tr. 60, L. 24-25; Tr. 61 L. 1, 2) and affirmation of the 
fact by the Industrial Commission of Utah (R. 101) that "the money 
deposited in [the savings account for Troy G. Nichols, minor son 
-9- I I 
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of Gary Nichols, deceased] is not meant to provide monthly sup, 
money. It can be withdrawn upon application to and approval 
by the Industrial Commission if good cause is shown." The ex, 
ence and conditional nature of that account were well known to 
counsel for plaintiff who, as an officer of Carbon Emery Bank 
(R. 134, para. 2) received the Industrial Commission award IR. 
105), and as a director of Zions First National Bank, successcr 
to Carbon Emery Bank, apparently remains privy to information 
regarding that account. (Tr. 60, L. 14-25; Tr. 61, L. 1-25; Tr. 
62, L. 1-25). Since the court indicated a clear intent ITr. 
62, L. 4-6) to regard that savings account as Boni' s own monev: 
an asset acquired by her as a result of the marriage (F.F. 8,· ! 
R. 123); and as an asset to offset increased value in the home l 
95), no amount of evidence could have altered the result. 
The balance of the funds, being held in an informal trust 
arrangement pursuant to agreement of the parties, should not 
be disturbed by regarding the accumulated amounts as a "trade 
off" for any support which John may have rendered Boni' s chi!C. 
Since commencement of this action, the legislature of t~ 
State of Utah has declared the public policy that, "a step par:·: 
shall support a step child to the same extent that a natural~ 
adoptive parent is required to support a child." ( 78-45-4.1, 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended). While not retrospectively applicabJ:: 
this actic> , that enactment simply continues and reinforces th: 
I 
practical fact of life that support of a step child cannot nv 
-10-
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tically be regarded apart from support rendered its parent. 
Research does not disclose a case where a trial court has 
evaluated support rendered a step child and regarded that 
calculated amount as an asset of the child's natural parent in 
awarding division of property. The court further, erroneously, 
regarded monthly benefit payments to Boni's child in computing her 
monthly income (R. 124, para. 9). Inasmuch as John has no continu-
ing obligation to support Boni's child by a prior marriage, the 
child's income and expenses are not properly considered in estab-
lishing the need for alimony. Boni's affidavit (R. 22) fairly 
stated her monthly expenses, and it must have been against that 
unrebutted figure that the court should have examined Boni's need 
for support. 
Point IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING PLAINTIFF'S 
HISTORICAL ABILITY TO PAY SUPPORT IN 
DENYING ALIMONY 
"In the recent decisions of Cummings v. Cummings, 562 P.2d 
229, 1977, and Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256, 1977, 
this court ruled the trial court may properly consider a husband's 
historical earning ability, when he has experienced a temporary 
decrease in income, when determining the amount he should contri-
bute for the support and maintenance of his family. Tt1~ principle 
should be equally applicable, when the husband experiences unusual 
prosperity during one year. (English v. Engli :, supra). Somehow, 
during the greatest part of this seven year marriage, John was 
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able to pay Boni a household allowance of six hundred dollars 
($600.00) per month for nearly seven years, until just shore~ 
before the complaint was filed (Tr. 37, L. 9-22), and was ab., 
make all other monthly payments. (Tr. 38, L. 3-6). It may wet: 
that inadvertance has permitted the one hundred precent cash 
operation of the Helper Coin-Op, eighty percent cash operati~ 
the Price Self Service Laundry, and the nineteen percent cas\ 
operation of the Price Steam Laundry (R. 64, Ans. ll(a)) toe: 
John's bookkeeping, although they were available for support. 
the family during the marriage. 
The court's finding (f.F. 10, R. 124) "that the plaintii' 
does not have the ability to pay alimony" appears to be based I 
principally upon the fact that "he is required to pay for the 
support and insurances for his children by a his first marri~ 
(f.F. 7, R. 123), which obligations will shortly terminate 1 :.' 
Decree of Divorce, p. 3, pa+a. 2 and 3) and which, in any eve·· 
he has not paid according to the terms of the Decree. (Tr. 2:. 
23-24, passim). Moreover, the support obligations were in ex: 
tence and known to John at the time he entered into marriap>: 
Boni, and the marriage altered neither the prior support obc~: 
tion nor his treatment of that obligation. 
The evidence given in the case does not support John's:) 
of impecuniosity. Until just prior to the divorce, he was~­
able to support his family by paying ordinary bills in addit;:I 
a household allowance. (Tr. 37-38). While the court refusec 
-12-
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allow testimony regarding the possibility that John's father had 
no intention of collecting the balance of the purchase price for 
the business (Tr. 42), there is a clear inference that this is the 
fact. 
John's marriage to Boni, knowing that she depended upon him 
financially just as he depended upon her for the amenities of 
marriage including household management, requires that he assist 
her financially until, at the very least, she can achieve the 
financial independence she is actively seeking. (Tr. 64, 72). 
The apparent contradiction of John's precarious financial 
condition contrasted with a local bank's willingness to loan 
him money without current financial statements (Tr. 88, L. 16-18) 
is probably best explained by the remark of John's counsel (whose 
official banking position must be remembered) that "this is just 
a little country town and everybody knows what you've got.'' (Tr. 
89, L. 22-23). 
Point V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Boni testified (Tr. 81, L. 4-8) regarding her arrangement 
for attorney's fees in this matter. Neither the court nor counsel 
for the plaintiff questioned the arrangement, the total fees, 
nor their reasonableness. The very bulk of the record eloquent-
ly demonstrates the devotion of so many hours of time in at-
tempting to resolve, and later defending, this action. Much of 
-13-
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the effort of Boni' s counsel was expended in attempting to Sec_ 
faithful performance of rules promulgated by this Court and ti\ 
avoidance of procedural conduct of the case prejudicial to B~ 
interest. 
Apart from the plaintiff's fault in aggrandizing Boni's 
attorney's fees, which should be considered, the court fail~: 
consider that, in awarding John all of the income and income 
producing assets of the marriage, it had deprived Boni of a~ 
realistic practical means of paying her attorneys fees. 
In denying any award, the Court again relied upon the sur-
vivor's benefits which had been accumulated for Boni's son. 
96). 
Based upon John's fault in the conduct of this action, R 
Boni's financial inability, this Court should order that Jo~~ 
Boni's attorney's fees incurred in defending the action and 
prosecuting this appeal. 
Point VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
A NEW TRIAL 
One of the grounds upon which defendant sought a new tr~ 
was "excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been ( 
under the influence of passion or prejudice." (R.98, para. z, 
The conduct of the suit, the transcript, and the orders 
of the court are replete with examples of bias which favor ~ 
plaintiff. 
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Notwithstanding the extreme difficulty with which information 
was extracted from the plaintiff upon written interrogatories, 
over the objection of counsel for defendant, the court set a 
trial date which effectively foreclosed further, fruitful dis-
covery. (R. 58) 
The court failed to comply with Rule 4.1 of the Rules of 
Practice of the District Courts by setting a special trial date at 
a time when the plaintiff was in default by having failed to 
answer the counter-claim; this matter not being one of extra-
ordinary urgency; notice of a special trial setting to all parties 
upon good cause shown was not given; and there was no written 
stipulation as required by Rule 15 of the Rules of Practice of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court. 
In trial, the court refused to allow questioning of the plain-
tiff regarding possible forgiveness of a debt owing to his father 
(Tr. 42) although the court utilized that debt in calculating 
plaintiff's total indebtedness (R. 122); the court quarreled with 
the defendant's right to state an opinion as to her estimate of 
value of real property of the marriage, but in a manner indicative 
of intent to disregard the opinion allowed her testimony (T. 70). 
The court refused to allow testimony regarding income to be de-
rived from Boni's child's assets (T. 67-68) though he had pre-
viously permitted testimony relative to those assets on examina-
tion by counsel for plaintiff, over objection (T. 51), and though 
he ultimately used that prospective income in assessing defen-
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dant's need for alimony (R. 124 para. 9). 
Post-trial, the court failed to require compliance with pl 
2. 9 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts that a pre. 
posed Decree be filed within fifteen (15) days after the rul~ 
the court, and, when the failure was brought to the court's aGI 
tent ion pursuant to Rule 2. 8 of the Rules of Practice, the co~: 
permitted the matter to be set for hearing upon notice inadeqc:, 
under Rule 6(a) and (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedurerl 
Rule 2.S(d) of the Rules of Practice, and at that hearing sirr.c. 
struck the matter. 
The admissions and refusal to admit testimony at trial,~ 
the findings and various orders of the court demonstrates a cLI 
pattern by the court to so construct the evidence as to ex-
1 
tinguish, by ignoring, Boni's rights in marital property a~1 
right to support. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court effectively decreed an annulment of this. 
seven year marriage. Equity dictates no less than that the jc.J 
property of the parties be sold and equity divided between t~ 
that there should be awarded alimony not less than the five 
hundred dollars ( $500. 00) a month she last received as a housi· 
allowance; and that she be awarded her attorney's fees incmn 
principally by the respondent's lack of good faith in conduct 
this case, and her financial inability to bear the costs a~ 
expenses incurred in defending the action and prosecuting thi'. 
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